AN ARMY MADE OF SCRATCH   ![]()  |            ||||
It was not the most efficient way to build an army — hand delivering walkie-talkies, flying halfway around the world with a few thousand dollars in cash to buy some AK-47s, while at the same time running a roofing business and battling Bajram Curri’s thugs — but somehow it worked. With Florin’s efforts, and those of the Homeland Calling Fund’s European fund-raisers, the Kosovo Liberation Army continued to function. In spite of the increased Serb border patrols, a communication network bought at Radio Shack, and a limited arms supply interrupted by fellow Albanians in both official and unofficial capacities, the weapons smuggling convoys continued to penetrate into Kosovo. Night after night, the KLA grew bigger as Albanians across Kosovo took up arms and declared themselves loyal to the rebel force.
             Before long, uniformed KLA soldiers were visible in the outskirts                  of most towns and across the province, building bunkers and setting                  up roadblocks. They didn’t look very elegant. The men were                  dressed in a mishmash of camouflage that reflected the countries                  that had significant Albanian communities. Their guns were mostly                  AK-47s and hunting rifles. Their bunkers were made out of tree                  branches, rocks, tablecloths and whatever else they could find                  rummaging through their houses. They made roadblocks out of old                  tractors, trucks, farm tools, tires, bales of hay and bulldozers.                  But they were the most welcome presence on the ground that Kosovo                  Albanians had ever seen. 
             Suddenly what had always seemed impossible now seemed possible.                  The Albanians outnumbered the Serbs nine to one and virtually                  every one them was supporting the KLA. Their fear of the police                  seemed to diminish by the day. The guerrillas seemed to grow bolder                  and bolder in challenging the police. Soon, they were moving to                  within a few hundred yards of sandbagged police checkpoints and                  firing regularly on police convoys. They dug trenches on ridge                  tops and manned them with machine guns overlooking Serb positions.                  In one village, they even sent a note to the police station daring                  the officers to come and get them. By the end of April, the attacks                  and counterattacks had grown so frequent that the rap-rap-rap                  of automatic weapons was constant in the countryside. Kosovo was                  at war. 
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             As the KLA and the Serb police and military faced off against                  one another, the international press corps descended on Kosovo                  to cover the conflict. At first view, the vagabond KLA, with its                  motley uniforms, silly roadblocks, pathetic hunting rifles and                  sheer determination, seemed to be engaged in a heroic struggle.                  Against all odds, it had risen up from nowhere to battle a far                  better-armed force.
             The KLA did its dirty work at night, in small groups, out of view                  of the media. For many weeks, the guerrillas picked off a policeman                  here and there. Soon however, the emboldened guerrillas started                  intimidating and threatening local Serbs. Rumors also spread that                  they were kidnapping Serbs and holding them prisoner. But the                  press didn’t see any of this.
             The Serb troops, by contrast, did their dirty work in plain view.                  With their faces painted black, police and military convoys began                  driving through Albanian villages with their assault weapons pointed                  out of their windows, spreading terror among the population. When                  they went in to attack a village, they set up checkpoints to keep                  the press out, but inevitably, when they were finished with their                  operation they left behind traces of their crimes. Once it was                  the mutilated corpses of two Albanian cattle herders in the Bistrica                  River. Another time it was the headless corpse of an old man who                  was probably too weak to flee with the rest of his family. Such                  horrors ensured that the KLA stayed well ahead on the public relations                  front. 
             As the rebels staged their nighttime guerrilla raids and Serb                  forces retaliated by attacking the villages that harbored them,                  the death toll slowly crept up, and each death was commemorated                  with much ceremony. Thousands upon thousands of Albanians attended                  the funeral of each slain civilian and fighter, and inevitably                  the funerals turned into KLA rallies. After each one, the Albanians                  left with more resolve to fight. The populace seemed undeterred                  by death. Each Albanian who died became a martyr for Kosovo, and                  scores of willing new fighters were born. Families talked about                  the need to sacrifice their sons to the cause. They knew that                  the Serbs had overwhelming military power, but over and over they                  repeated that they were on the side of right and had more motivated                  fighters. They might have to fight a war of attrition, but they                  had tens of thousands of willing fighters at home and in the diaspora,                  and eventually they would triumph.
             For the Serbs, it was different. Thousands of them turned out                  to commemorate the death of their slain policemen as well, but                  while those gatherings no doubt cemented the Serbs’ bitterness                  and hatred of the Albanians, they did not breed a resolve to fight.                  Most of the army and police fighting in Kosovo were not from there;                  they had been sent there to fight from elsewhere in Serbia and                  they resented it. They felt for the two hundred thousand Serbs                  who lived in Kosovo, but that didn’t mean they were willing                  to risk their lives for them. When Serb troops moved in and attacked                  a village, they did not dare try to hold it, because that made                  them too vulnerable to Albanian attacks. Spooked by how quickly                  the KLA grew, they were increasingly confining themselves to the                  cities or hiding behind sandbagged bunkers on the province’s                  main roads. 
             Soon, counterinsurgency experts were saying that Milosevic had                  vastly miscalculated in Kosovo. In order for the Serbs to squash                  the guerrilla movement, they would need to outnumber the KLA by                  a ratio of ten to one. The Serbs had nowhere near those numbers                  and they probably never would. Even if Milosevic increased the                  number of troops in the province, the rebels could still call                  on tens of thousands of potential fighters living in the diaspora.                  Indeed, many were already coming. On any given day the rusted                  hulk of a ferry from Koman was packed full of Kosovo Albanians                  returning to their homeland from abroad, many of whom spoke better                  German or French than they did Albanian.
Although the Albanian government continued to insist that it was doing everything it could to crack down on the gunrunning, many government and army officials began aiding the KLA. They began providing them army vehicles and armed escorts to move their weapons north. They also opened up several military facilities to the KLA and allowed several Albanian army officers to provide training and assistance.
             At long last, all of the ingredients for a successful guerrilla                  insurgency were now in place. The KLA had overwhelming popular                  support; a steady supply of money, arms and fighters; and a safe                  haven across the border in Albania, where the guerrillas could                  receive training.

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